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ABSTRACT
Social cognition was evaluated among subgroups of schizophrenics from stories 
told to the Picture Arrangement (PA) subtest of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale- 
Revised (WAIS-R). PA stories were scored on six measures that were developed to 
measure social cognition. Symptom ratings were made using the Scale for the 
Assessment of Negative Symptoms (SANS) and the Scale for the Assessment of Positive 
Symptoms (SAPS) and evaluated on three dimensions: negative, disorganized, and 
psychotic. Of the three syndromal dimensions only disorganized symptoms were 
predictive of scores on the PA derived measures. When IQ subtest scale scores (PA) were 
entered into a regression equation with disorganization scores however, the IQ subtest 
scores were the only significant predictors of all but two social cognition scales. Further 
research should be conducted to determine if social cognition measures assess more than 
general cognitive ability.
Social Cognition and Schizophrenia Syndromes
2INTRODUCTION
Schizophrenia is a debilitating illness that impacts all aspects of the lives of those 
affected by it. Researchers have long sought to understand the etiology of schizophrenia, 
to appropriately categorize its symptoms and to develop effective methods of treatment. 
Recently there has been a growing body of research that suggests the applicability of a 
social cognition model for understanding schizophrenia. Social cognition has been found 
to be relevant to the understanding and treating of other mental disorders, particularly 
depression and anxiety (Abramson, 1988; Dobson & Kendall, 1993). As social 
dysfunction is one of the primary symptoms of schizophrenia a social cognitive approach 
to the understanding and treatment of the disorder is particularly relevant (American 
Psychiatric Association, DSM-IV, 1994).
Frith, (Corcoran, Mercer & Frith, 1995; Frith & Corcoran, 1996; Corcoran, Cahill 
& Frith, 1997) and Hardy-Bayle (Sarfati, Hardy-Bayle, Nadel, Chevalier & Widloecher, 
1997; Sarfati, Hardy-Bayle, Besche & Widloecher, 1997; Sarfati, Hardy-Bayle, Brunet & 
Widloecher, 1999) have conducted research on how theory of mind (ToM), may be an 
underlying construct of social cognition, and how deficiencies of ToM relate to particular 
symptoms of schizophrenia. This study will expand on these findings by considering 
ToM as well as additional aspects of social cognition as they relate to syndromal patterns 
of schizophrenia. A measure of social cognition will be derived from ratings of stories 
told to the Picture Arrangement subtest of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale- Revised 
(WAIS-R; Wechsler, 1981).
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“Many people with schizophrenia experience disabilities in several domains of 
social functioning, such as interpersonal relationships, self-care skills, education, work 
and personal achievement, finances, housing, recreation, physical health and wellness, 
mental health and drug abuse, spirituality, and legal matters” (Corrigan & Penn, 2001, p. 
4). As compared to both clinical (affective disordered patients) and nonclinical control 
groups, individuals with schizophrenia demonstrate deficits on measures of social skills 
including a role-play test of social skills, a social adjustment scale, and a quality of life 
scale (Bellack, Morrison, Wixted, & Muesser, 1990). These deficits are generally stable 
over time and typically do not significantly improve simply as a result of improvements 
in specific symptoms. Mueser, Bellack, Douglas, and Morrison (1991) found that when 
comparing individuals with schizophrenia to non-psychiatric controls on measures of 
social skills using a role play test, 67% of schizophrenics fell below the range of scores 
for the controls at initial assessment and 64% were below the range one year later.
Often in conjunction with an individual’s difficulty with social functioning he or 
she may withdraw from society, friends, and family, decreasing his or her level of social 
and emotional support. This can often lead to an exacerbation of symptoms. In addition, 
poor social interaction skills often limit the number of people a person with schizophrenia 
has available to rely on for support. Although it is generally accepted by mental health 
professionals that social skills training is an important component of rehabilitation for 
individuals with schizophrenia there is conflicting evidence of the effectiveness of such 
interventions (Morrison & Bellack, 1981). This conflicting evidence may be a result of 
the fact that deficits in social interactions are indicative of problems at one stage of
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cognitive processing, i.e. stimuli perception, and social skills training addresses the 
behaviors that may represent a different stage, i.e. response.
A great deal of research has been done assessing the ability of people with 
schizophrenia to accurately perceive and identify the emotional expressions of others. 
Penn, Combs, and Mohamed (2001) present a summary of many years of research on this 
topic concluding the following: schizophrenics generally show deficits in facial-affect 
perception; they demonstrate greater deficits for negative compared to positive facial 
expressions; and it may be the case that individuals with paranoid, as compared to 
nonparanoid, schizophrenia show less difficulty with facial-affect perception, although 
this is only based on limited findings. Penn et al. (2001) have also considered research 
that has evaluated how this impairment in facial-affect perception relates to social 
functioning. Fewer studies have been completed in this area of research but the results 
indicate that deficits in facial-affect perception are related to ward behavior, particularly 
difficulty with hygiene, grooming, social competence, social interest, and neatness.
The perceptual deficits associated with schizophrenia are not limited to 
interpretation of facial-affect. Penn et al (2001) reduced the large amount of research in 
this area to two major findings, “people with schizophrenia tend to be impaired in their 
perception of dynamic emotional displays... [and] have particular difficulty in discerning 
abstract, rather than concrete cues” (p. 102). Toomey (1997) specifically considered the 
relationship between nonverbal social perception and other areas of social functioning 
and found that individuals with schizophrenia as compared to normal controls performed 
significantly worse on tasks of social problem solving, social sequencing, and social 
judgment. Nonverbal social perception skills were significantly related to all social
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problem-solving skills, as well as to performance on the Picture Arrangement and 
Comprehension tasks of the WAIS-R (measures of sequencing and interpersonal 
interactions and knowledge of practical information and social conventions, 
respectively).
In summary, evidence strongly suggests a deficit in the perceptual abilities of 
individuals with schizophrenia, particularly in relation to socially related stimuli. The 
question remains, however, whether this difficulty is with actual perceptions or with the 
cognitive processing of these perceptions. Improved understanding of the relationship 
between social cognition and the symptoms of schizophrenia may aid in understanding 
this question and developing targeted interventions to improve social cognitive deficits 
and by extension social functioning.
Social cognition has been defined as “the processes and functions that allow a 
person to understand, act on, and benefit from the interpersonal world” (Corrigan &
Penn, 2001, p. 3). More specifically, Broks (1997) operationally defined social cognition 
as: “(1) the perception of the dispositions and intentions of other individuals; (2) the 
construction and maintenance of a viable concept of self; (3) the production and 
regulation of behavior in social contexts” (p. 107). Many individuals with schizophrenia 
have difficulties with aspects of social cognition and are unable to internalize others’ 
points of view (Diamond, 1956).
The ability to discern that others have minds and act in accordance with the 
contents of their minds has been described as theory of mind (ToM; Frith, 1992). Without 
thinking we use this theory of mind on a regular basis whenever we interact with others. 
We use this ability when we infer the intentions of someone else despite the content of
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their verbal communication; when we recognize that someone is lying or deceiving us; 
and when we participate in pretend mental activity. Frith (1992) explains that the reason 
we are able to do this without becoming hopelessly confused is because there are two 
separate mechanisms for mental representations. The first mechanism handles primary 
representations that have to do with the physical world. Propositions at this level can be 
objectively determined to be true or false. The second mechanism deals with 
metarepresentations that concern mental states. This refers to an understanding of our 
own and others’ mental states. This is a subjective understanding and therefore cannot be 
objectively determined as true or false. Frith (1992) uses an example of pretend play to 
explain this distinction. Frith explains,
During the first years of life, a child must learn about the properties of objects; for 
example, that a banana is yellow, curved, nice to eat, but must be peeled first. 
Then, at around 18 months, the child starts playing games of pretend. When the 
mother pretends that a banana is a telephone, why does this not hopelessly 
confuse everything the child has learned about bananas so far (p. 120)?
Primary representations are statements about the physical state of the banana, such as 
“this banana is edible” (p. 120). This statement can either be true or false and applies to 
all bananas. Metarepresentations, on the other hand, regard the attitude that is being held 
toward the banana, that “I pretend, this banana, it is a telephone” (p. 120). This statement 
cannot be evaluated as either true or false and it does not apply universally to all bananas. 
The child would need to use this metarepresentation to understand the intention of the 
mother, i.e., that she is pretending.
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It is widely accepted that people with autism or Asperger’s syndrome lack a ToM 
and thus cannot use metarepresentations. It is argued that these individuals lack the 
capacity to recognize that others have minds, a state that seems to result from a failure of 
neurodevelopment (Corcoran, 2001). Frith (1992) proposes that people with 
schizophrenia are similar to those with autism in that they both lack the ability to form 
metarepresentations. The difference is, however, that most individuals with schizophrenia 
did at one time (i.e. prior to their first breakdown) have functional use of this mechanism. 
According to Frith (1992), “the autistic person has never known that other people have 
minds. The schizophrenic knows well that other people have minds, but has lost the 
ability to infer the contents of these minds: their beliefs and intentions” (p. 121). In 
addition, the individual with schizophrenia will likely continue to infer the mental states 
as he or she had done effectively earlier in life even though he or she now lacks the 
mechanisms for metarepresentation. Predictably, this individual’s conclusions are 
generally going to be incorrect.
Frith (1992) postulates that this deficit in the ability for metarepresentation 
underlies all the widely varying features of schizophrenia. Specifically, Frith (1992) 
explains that there are three types of cognitive impairments that characterize the primary 
signs and symptoms of schizophrenia. The first is a lack of awareness of one’s own goals 
and intentions. This is believed to lead to negative symptoms such as abulia or poverty of 
will, alogia or poverty of words, and athymia or lack of feelings. This is thought to arise 
as a result of disruption to the system causing a complete inability to represent intentional 
behavior. This likely extends to a lack of awareness of others’ goals and intentions 
leading to the social withdrawal so often seen in schizophrenia. It is also suggested that
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this is related to some of the positive symptoms. According to Corcoran (2001) “passivity 
phenomena, such as delusions of control, thought insertion or withdrawal, and auditory 
hallucinations, arise as a result of a failure at a point within the system when one’s own 
intentions to act ought to be monitored” (p. 151). Auditory hallucinations, for example, 
involve the failure of the self-monitoring system because when the person makes 
inferences about the intentions and thoughts of others they are perceived as coming from 
an external source (Corcoran et al., 1995). The second type of impairment is a failure to 
take into account the state of knowledge of other people resulting in formal thought 
disorder. This presents itself in symptoms such as neologisms and the overuse of pronoun 
references. For example, in telling a story an individual with formal thought disorder may 
use pronouns exclusively without ever qualifying to whom he or she is specifically 
referring. The individual makes the mistake of presuming that the listener knows what the 
speaker knows. The third type of cognitive impairment results from faulty awareness of 
the intentions of others that often leads to mistaken beliefs as evidenced by delusions of 
reference and persecution as well as delusions of one’s thoughts being read. The 
schizophrenic may become suspicious when he or she can no longer infer the intentions 
of others and concludes that this is because the other person is trying to hide malevolent 
intentions. The false belief that others can read one’s thoughts may simply be the result of 
others using their intact ToM to correctly infer the intentions of the schizophrenic 
(Corcoran, 2001). Frith (1992) utilizes the ToM hypothesis as a way of understanding 
and categorizing the symptoms of schizophrenia in terms of the social cognitive deficits 
that underlie them.
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Sub-grouping o f Symptoms
The categorization of the symptoms of schizophrenia has long been, and 
continues to be, a very difficult task because often the classifications do little to reduce 
heterogeneity within the diagnostic groups. The DSM-IV (1994) continues to use 
diagnostic categories based on the studies of Kraepelin (1950) and Bleuler (1950) despite 
their poor predictive validity, particularly regarding prediction of response to treatment 
(Andreasen & Grove, 1986). Hughling-Jackson’s neurological concepts of positive and 
negative symptoms have been applied to the understanding of schizophrenia (as cited in 
Andreasen & Grove, 1986). In this case, positive symptoms refer to the presence of 
functions not evident in a healthy individual or exaggerations of normal functions (e.g. 
hallucinations and delusions). Negative symptoms refer to the absence or deficit of 
functions generally present in healthy individuals (e.g. poverty of content and avolition).
Crow (1982) has suggested that this distinction actually represents two separate 
syndromes rather than uncorrelated symptom dimensions. One syndrome, in his view, is 
the result of a neurochemical disturbance (i.e. positive symptoms) and the other is the 
result of structural changes in the brain (i.e. negative symptoms). Crow (1982) arrived at 
this conclusion based on the convergence of several lines of research. First, Crow (1982) 
considered the findings from brain imaging studies indicating that in some individuals 
affected by schizophrenia there is an increase in ventricular size. According to Crow 
(1982), “within the patient group, increased ventricular size was associated with 
intellectual impairment as in the case of dementia. It was also associated with the 
presence of negative symptoms” (p.352). Next Crow (1982) considered that in some 
individuals the disease might remit or respond to treatment with neuroleptic medications.
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Among this group Crow reports that the medications were selective to positive symptoms 
and that negative symptoms were generally not present. In the cases where negative 
symptoms were present they did not respond to the medication. Neuroleptic drugs are 
dopamine antagonists suggesting that positive symptoms may be the result of dysfunction 
in the dopamine system. Crow (1982) concluded that positive symptoms reflect a 
neurochemical disturbance most likely involving the dopaminergic pathways whereas; 
negative symptoms are the result of a degenerative process involving cell death and 
ultimately leading to changes in ventricular size and structural abnormalities of the brain. 
Crow (1982) suggested that the negative symptom syndrome is related to intellectual 
impairment and poorer prognosis as a result of the potentially irreversible brain structural 
changes.
Andreasen (1983; 1984) developed rating scales to measure positive and negative 
symptoms. These are the Scale for Assessment of Negative Symptoms (SANS) and the 
Scale for Assessment of Positive Symptoms (SAPS). Initial studies using the SANS and 
SAPS seemed to support the positive/negative subtyping of schizophrenia (Kulhara, Kota 
& Joseph, 1986). It is of importance to note however that while ratings of the SANS 
demonstrated high inter-rater reliability and internal consistency (above 0.70), the 
internal consistency for the SAPS was less than 0.40 (Andreasen & Olsen, 1982; 
Andreasen, 1982). Additional research indicated that the SANS and SAPS scales are 
actually measures of three, rather than two separate symptom dimensions. The additional 
component was a result of splitting the positive symptom domain into two factors; one 
composed of ratings of hallucinations and delusions and the other bizarre behavior and 
formal thought disorder. This distinction explains the low internal consistency of the
11
SAPS (Arndt, Alliger & Andreasen, 1991). Additional studies and a re-analysis of 
published SANS and SAPS ratings support the grouping of symptoms of schizophrenia 
into three independent groups: Hallucinations/Delusions (Psychotic dimension), Positive 
Thought Disorder and Bizarre Behavior (Disorganized dimension) and Negative 
Symptoms (Andreasen, Ardnt, Alliger, Miller & Flaum, 1995; Klimidis, Stuart, Minas, 
Copolov & Singh, 1993; Liddle, 1987; Minas et al., 1992).
Relationship between Cognition, Social Functioning, and Sub-groupings
Several lines of evidence suggest that the symptom sub-groupings are 
differentially related to cognitive and social abilities. While both negative and 
disorganized symptoms are related to impaired performance on measures of cognitive 
functions, individuals with a predominance of disorganized symptoms appear to evidence 
the greatest impairment in both cognitive and social functioning. Individuals with mostly 
positive symptoms show the fewest deficits. Rowe and Shean (1997) conducted an 
experiment to evaluate the ability for individuals with schizophrenia to improve their 
performance on the Wisconsin Card Sort Test (WCST) with coaching and incentives. 
They reported that individuals with a predominance of negative or psychotic symptoms 
were able to improve their WCST performance following coaching instructions and 
provision of small monetary incentives. Individuals with a predominance of symptoms of 
disorganization, however, were not able to improve their performance even with explicit 
coaching instructions and incentives. An additional study by Shean, Burnett, and Eckman 
(2002) extended these findings by evaluating schizophrenics performance on a battery of 
neuropsychological tests including the digit span, digit vigilance, logical memory, and 
Trails A and B. Participants were tested and then provided with instructions on how to
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improve their performance and retested. Symptoms of disorganization were associated 
with a lack of improvement following instruction showing only minimal improvement in 
performance on the digit vigilance, logical memory, and Trails A and B tests. Negative 
symptoms were also associated with a lack of improvement, but only on the logical 
memory task. Psychotic symptoms were related to improved post-instruction 
performance. The authors suggest, “it may be that the disorganization symptoms 
themselves functioned to interfere with attentional processes; as a result, participants did 
not attend to or process the instructions. An alternative interpretation is that these 
symptoms reflect dysfunctions in neural systems that are needed to perform effectively 
these cognitive tasks” (Shean et al., 2002; p. 729).
Research by Walker and Harvey (1986) and Comblatt, Lenzenweger, Dworkin, 
and Erlenmeyer-Kimling (1985) supported the proposition that impairments of attentional 
processes are associated with symptoms of disorganization. Walker and Harvey (1986) 
evaluated attentional performance using a digit-span task and demonstrated that high 
ratings of disorganized symptoms were inversely related to performance on the 
distraction condition of the task. Attentional and information-processing deficits were 
also tested by Comblatt et al. (1985) using the Information Overload task under three 
distraction conditions. Condition one involved no distraction, condition two used 
undifferentiated background noise, and condition three had a male voice reciting stories 
in the background that the participants were told they would later have to answer 
questions about. Positive symptoms were related to distraction, whereas negative 
symptoms were associated with lowered processing capacity. It is important to note that
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in this study the positive symptom category was not divided into the psychotic and 
disorganization sub-groupings.
Additional research has been conducted evaluating the relationship between 
symptom sub-groups and social abilities. Brekke, DeBonis, and Graham (1994) 
compared social functioning, assessed on the Community Adjustment Form, among the 
three symptom dimensions. Generally, disorganized and negative symptoms were more 
strongly correlated with impaired social functioning. Specifically, disorganized 
symptoms were negatively related to days worked, quality of friendships, social 
satisfaction, and social competence and negative symptoms were negatively related to 
days worked, quantity, frequency, and quality of friendships, social satisfaction, and 
social competence. Positive symptoms were only related to poorer quality of friendships 
and less social satisfaction. Research by Liddle (1987) examined the association between 
symptoms, self-care, occupation, and social function. The disorganization factor and the 
negative symptoms factor were related to greater impairment in the areas assessed. 
Disorganization was significantly related to the greatest number of impairments, namely: 
poor grooming and hygiene, impersistence at work, and social inattentiveness. Negative 
symptoms were related to problems with physical anergia and relationships with friends 
and peers. The positive symptoms factor did not correlate significantly with any 
functioning area. This body of research comparing symptom sub-groups and their 
relationship to general and social cognitive skills presents a consistent picture in which 
individuals with a predominance of disorganized symptoms demonstrate significant 
impairments. The social and cognitive skills of those who experience negative symptoms
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are also often impaired, while individuals with psychotic symptoms of hallucinations and 
delusions appear to be only mildly impaired.
Measures o f Social Cognition
Several paradigms have been developed to assess ToM in relation to the 
symptoms of schizophrenia. Corcoran et al. (1995) developed a task to assess the ability 
to “infer the real intentions behind indirect speech utterances” (p. 7). The test was 
composed of 10 passages each of which describes the interactions of two characters. At 
the end of the passage one of the characters drops an obvious hint and the participant is 
asked what the character really meant by it. This is known as the hinting task. 
Performance on this task by people with schizophrenia was poorer than that of normal 
controls. When specific symptoms of schizophrenia were assessed individuals with 
symptoms of disorganization scored most poorly followed by those with negative 
features and then people with paranoid delusions. Frith and Corcoran (1996) utilized a 
second measure of ToM in which participants heard stories that contained false beliefs or 
deceptions and were simultaneously shown cartoon pictures corresponding to the story. 
Following the story, participants were asked one memory question that required recalling 
a piece of the story and one question that required inferring the mental state of one of the 
characters. The primary finding of this research was that individuals with paranoid 
delusions were most impaired on the mental state questions as compared to those with 
passivity symptoms (i.e., delusions of control or reference, thought insertion, thought 
withdrawal and/or second person auditory hallucinations in the absence of paranoid 
symptoms) and normal controls. Individuals with behavioral symptoms (e.g., poverty of 
speech, flattening of affect, social withdrawal, incoherent speech, and incongruity of
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affect) also had difficulty with the mental state questions, but this appeared to be related 
to memory impairments. A third method was devised to test ToM using joke cards 
(Corcoran, et al., 1997). In this study there were two sets of 10 joke cards. One set of 
cards had jokes that were behavioral in nature (i.e. slapstick type comedy). The other set 
of cards had jokes that required the inference of the character’s mental state to “get it”. 
The participants were then asked to explain each joke. Individuals with schizophrenia had 
the most difficult time explaining the mental state jokes. Specifically, the behavioral 
signs group, those with paranoid symptoms, and the passivity features subgroup all 
demonstrated the most marked impairment. Although the cumulative results of this 
research seem to indicate that different symptoms affect ToM tasks in particular ways, 
results do not consistently demonstrate which symptom patterns are related to poorer 
performance on ToM tasks. Sarfati et al. (1997a; 1997b; 1999) devised a slightly 
different type of ToM task in which participants were asked to read a comic strip and 
then select one of two (Sarfati et al., 1997a) or three (Sarfati et al., 1997b; 1999) answer 
cards that most logically complete the sequence. Individuals with thought and language 
disorders (disorganized symptoms) (Sarfati et al., 1997a; 1997b; 1999) as compared to 
those with other symptoms showed the most impairment in their ability to attribute 
intentions and false beliefs to characters in the comic strip.
The Picture Arrangement (PA) subtest of the WAIS-R has been identified as a 
potentially useful measure of “intelligence relevant to social functioning” (Lipsitz, 
Dworkin, & Erlenmeyer-Kimling, 1993; p. 430) because o f its socially relevant content. 
According to Ott et al. (1998) the PA subtest “assesses the subject’s ability for perceptual 
organization and sequencing, to distinguish essential from non-essential details in a social
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context, and requires integrated brain functioning” (p. 4). The task in the PA subtest 
involves presenting a series of cards to the participant in a mixed up sequence and then 
requesting that the participant rearrange the cards so that the pictures tell a logical story. 
Toomey, Wallace, Corrigan, Schuldberg, and Green (1997) found differences on PA 
scores for individuals with schizophrenia as compared to normal controls.
Westen and Segal (1990) developed a methodology to study social cognition 
using stories told to the Picture Arrangement (PA) subtest of the WAIS-R. Having the 
participant “tell the story” adds a projective component that “allows clinicians to draw 
inferences about the way patients experience people and relationships from the content of 
their stories” (p. 1). In this case the participant is instructed to rearrange the pictures and 
then to “tell the story” they used in the organization of the cards. Utilizing these 
additional measures one can gather information regarding the participants understanding 
of the cards even if they do not arrange them in the correct order. Considering the 
arrangement alone leads to two potential problems, first, that the participant may have 
arranged the cards in the correct order, but did not really understand the relations between 
the cards; or second, that the participant has arranged the cards in the wrong order but has 
a reasonable and logical story to go along with the arrangement. This measure appears to 
hold promise as a means of assessing the relationship between symptom syndromes and 
aspects of social cognition
Westen and Segal (1990) have developed a scoring system using performance on 
the WAIS-R PA subtest to measure social cognition. They have presented evidence of 
satisfactory levels of interrater reliability and convergent and discriminant validity for six
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measures of social cognition and object relations derived from PA stories. The six 
dimensions are:
[1] Episode integration (the capacity to derive a coherent and integrated account 
of events), [2] accuracy of causal attributions (the capacity to attribute plausible 
causes of events), [3] affect-tone of relationship paradigms (the degree to which 
described relationships or interactions are characterized by benevolent, neutral, or 
malevolent affective quality), [4] capacity for emotional investment in 
relationships and moral standards (the extent to which relationships are defined in 
other than need-gratifying terms), [5] complexity of representation, and [6] the 
accuracy of character ascription (the extent to which people are perceived 
accurately and without significant idiosyncratic intrusions) (Segal, Westen, Lohr, 
& Silk, 1993, p. 59).
Interrater reliabilities for the six scales were as follows: Episode Integration, .84; 
Accuracy of Causal Attributions, .82; Affect-Tone of Relationship Paradigms, .90; 
Capacity for Emotional Investment in Relationships and Moral Standards, .90; 
Complexity of Representations, .96; and Accuracy of Character Ascriptions, .89 (Segal et 
al., 1993). Each measure can be reliably rated from stories using a scoring manual 
developed by Westen and Segal (1990).
Segal and colleagues used this methodology to assess social cognition and object 
relations in individuals with borderline personality disorder, depression and normal 
comparison individuals (Segal, Westen, Lohr, Silk & Cohen, 1992; Segal et al., 1993). 
Segal et al. (1993) found that PA scores correlated with Social Adjustment Scale scores. 
In particular Episode Integration, Accuracy of Causal Attributions, and Emotional
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Investment mean scores correlated significantly with Social Adjustment total mean 
scores. Research utilizing these six scales indicated that mean PA subscale scores 
significantly distinguished between pathological samples (i.e. borderline patients and 
depressed patients) and normal controls (Segal et al., 1992; 1993).
Current Study
This research will test the ability of Westen and Segal’s (1990) WAIS-R PA 
derived measures of social cognition to distinguish between the three syndromal groups 
of schizophrenia (negative, disorganized, and psychotic), as defined by Andreasen and 
others (Andreasen et al., 1995; Klimidis et al., 1993; Liddle, 1987; Minas et al., 1992), 
and bipolar disordered participants. Participants will be rated on each of the three 
syndromal dimensions of schizophrenia in order to reduce heterogeneity within samples. 
Individuals with bipolar disorder were selected as a psychotic comparison group. 
Although at times people with bipolar disorder may present with psychotic symptoms 
that appear similar to those of schizophrenia, the illnesses are believed to represent two 
distinct diseases with different underlying pathologies. Research evaluating differences in 
information processing among schizophrenia and bipolar disordered participants 
indicated that a computerized battery of information processing tasks correctly classified 
75.5% of the cases (Tam, Sewell & Deng, 1998). It is anticipated that bipolar individuals 
will approximate the demographics of those with schizophrenia, but will evidence less 
impairment on social cognitive processes.
In this study the PA measures of social cognition will be related to symptom 
patterns. It is hypothesized that individuals with a predominance of disorganized 
symptoms will demonstrate the greatest impairments of social cognition as evidenced by
19
lower scores on the six PA measures. In addition, participants with DSM-IV diagnosis of 
bipolar disorder will perform better then all other syndromal groups on social cognition 
measures. It is further predicted that diagnosis and symptom ratings will be related to 
performance on the PA social cognition tasks independent of WAIS-R PA scale score 
estimates of general intelligence.
20
METHODS
Participants
Participants were identified from the patient population of a large psychiatric 
hospital in Virginia. Patients were invited to participate in the study if they met the 
following criteria: (1) primary DSM-IV (1994) diagnosis of schizophrenia, 
schizoaffective disorder, or bipolar disorder, (2) under the age of 60, (3) no secondary 
diagnosis of mental retardation or organic disorder, and (4) free of substance use for a
"N
minimum of two weeks. Patients were approached as soon as they were determined by 
unit staff to be safe to go off of the ward and were able to provide informed consent. Of 
the approximately 75 patients approached 47 agreed to participate and completed all 
tasks. All participants provided informed consent. This group was comprised of 13 
individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia, 16 diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder, 
and 18 diagnosed with bipolar disorder. Thirty-seven of the participants were admitted 
and evaluated in the acute inpatient facility and ten were residing and evaluated in the 
long-term rehabilitation program. Twenty-one of the participants were male and 26 were 
female. Their average age was 38.80. Participants were offered a soda or snack as 
compensation for their participation.
Materials
The Wide Range Achievement Test-3 (WRAT-3, Wilkinson, 1993) Reading 
subtest was administered to provide an estimate of premorbid IQ score (Johnstone, 
Callahan, Kapila & Bouman, 1996). Evidence of sufficient reliability and validity of the
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WRAT-3 has been demonstrated (Snelbaker, Wilkinson, Robertson & Glutting, 2001). 
The WRAT-3 requires the participant to read a row of letters and as many words as they 
can from a list of 42.
The WAIS-R Picture Arrangement subtest was administered following the 
methodology outlined by Westen and Segal (1990). Each participant was presented with 
10 sets of picture cards (the first being a sample) in a mixed up order. The participant was 
instructed to rearrange the cards so that they were in a logical sequential order. 
Participants were timed, but there was no time limit enforced. After the cards were 
arranged the participants were asked to “tell the story” they used in determining the card 
sequence. The researcher wrote down the story as the participant was telling it. Coding of 
the PA stories was completed following the guidelines specified by Westen and Segal 
(1990) in the scoring manual.
Two coders scored the six measures of the PA stories. In order to become reliable 
in this scoring each coder began by scoring eight sets of sample stories provided by 
Westen and Segal (1990). With these sample stories Westen and Segal (1990) provided 
written rationales for the scoring so that the coders could better understand the 
application of the scoring guidelines. The first ten participants’ (1-10) PA stories were 
subsequently scored by each coder independently. The coders then met and discussed 
their scoring, further clarifying the guidelines. For measures the coders did not 
consistently agree on the responses were discussed, in the context of the scoring manual, 
until a consensus score was agreed upon. The agreed upon scores were then utilized in 
analysis. The next ten participants’ (11-21) PA stories were also scored independently by 
both coders and these scores were used to establish interrater reliability.
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An informal interview was conducted including questions from the SANS 
(Andreasen, 1983) and SAPS (Andreasen, 1984). Ratings on the SANS and SAPS were 
used to identify ratings on syndromal dimensions. Interviewers conducted interviews 
together for the first seven participants, coded SANS and SAPS symptoms separately and 
then compared ratings. Utilizing the guidelines for administration of the SANS and 
SAPS, interviewers came to agreement on how symptoms would be coded. A modified 
and abbreviated Premorbid Adjustment Scale (PAS; Gittelman-Klein & Klein, 1969) was 
completed based on participant responses in the interview and hospital records.
Procedure
Names of potential participants were collected from current hospital census 
records. These names were then reviewed by hospital clinical staff to determine 
appropriateness for current participation. Patients who met the criteria to be taken off the 
ward were identified and later approached by the interviewer or by the interviewer and a 
hospital psychologist and invited to participate in the study. At this time the individual 
was provided with a brief verbal description of the interview and tasks and notified of the 
soda/snack incentive. For those patients who agreed to participate the interviewer 
escorted them to a private meeting room and began the study. The participant was first 
presented with the informed consent agreement. The participant was given the option to 
read the form or have it read to them. The interviewer confirmed that the individual 
understood the agreement prior to signing.
Each interview began with administration of the WRAT-3. The instructions for 
the WRAT-3 were explained as specified in the manual (Wilkinson, 1993). Individuals 
were instructed to read the letters that were presented across the top of the page and then
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to read the words across each row. Participants were informed to do their best and try to 
pronounce each word. Next the WAIS-R PA subtest was administered. The instructions 
provided for this administration followed the guidelines set out in the WAIS-R manual 
(Wechsler, 1981). The participant was presented with the first set of cards, the practice 
set, and instructed to rearrange the cards so that they tell a story. If the participant had 
difficulty with the practice set the researcher demonstrated how the cards should be 
arranged, then the cards were put back in the original order and the participant was asked 
to try again. Once the participant had arranged the first set of cards correctly the 
researcher explained that the participant would be asked to tell the story they used in the 
arrangement of the cards. For the practice set the researcher provided a sample story. The 
participant was then presented with the second set of cards and instructed to rearrange the 
cards so that they tell a story and to indicate to the researcher when the cards were in the 
arrangement they wanted. The participant would then be asked to tell the story they used 
in the arrangement of the cards. This procedure was repeated for the remainder of the 
card sets. Finally, the test session concluded with the informal interview. The informal 
interview involved the researcher asking the participant questions about how they were 
currently feeling, what brought them into the hospital, if they were feeling differently 
then when they first came to the hospital, as well as some personal history questions (e.g., 
when they were first hospitalized, if they were married or had children, etc). The 
interviewer pursued fiirther any answers that provided information about symptoms the 
participant experienced. When the interview was completed the participant was asked if 
he or she had any questions. The interviewer answered all questions and the participant 
was taken back to the ward. The duration of interview sessions ranged from
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approximately 30 minutes to one and one-half hours. The majority of interviews were 
completed in 45 minutes. After the interview session was completed the researcher 
examined the participants’ medical chart for demographic information and confirmation 
of social history information.
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RESULTS
Demographic and clinical information for all participants is presented in Table 1. 
An ANOVA was performed on these variables to identity any significant differences 
between diagnostic groups. There was a significant difference on Premorbid Adjustment 
scores, F(2, 44) = 3.70,p  = .03. Post hoc analysis using Tukey’s HSD procedure 
indicated that individuals diagnosed with bipolar disorder had significantly higher 
premorbid adjustment scores than individuals diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder, 
mean difference = -1.52, p< .03.
SANS and SAPS global symptom ratings for each participant were combined to 
create the three syndromal dimension scores: the global rating for negative symptoms 
was used to form the negative symptom score, the sum of the global ratings for delusions 
and hallucinations were used to create the psychotic symptoms score, and the sum of the 
global ratings for formal thought disorder and bizarre thoughts and behaviors was 
calculated to create the disorganized symptoms score. The syndrome groupings were 
analyzed as continuous variables since most of the participants evidenced symptoms of 
more than one of the syndromes. Each participant has a score for all three syndromal 
dimensions. The syndromal dimensions did not significantly correlate with each other 
confirming that they are assessing distinct sets of symptoms.
The first twenty participants’ PA stories were double-coded independently by two 
coders. Each of the coders had been trained using the detailed scoring manuals provided 
by Westen and Segal (1990). Of the first twenty participants’ PA stories the scoring of
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the last ten participants’ stories were used to establish interrater reliability. Reliability of 
the Capacity for Emotional Investment could not be computed because there was no 
variance in the scores. However, both judges had perfect agreement in their coding of this 
scale. Reliability for the remaining five PA derived measures scales was computed using 
Pearson’s r. Correlations were computed comparing each coders ratings on the six 
derived measures for each of the PA stories. The average of the correlations was 
computed across stories for each scale. The mean reliabilities for the scales were as 
follows: Integration of Episodes, .74; Accuracy of Causal Attributions, .67; Affect-Tone 
of Relationship, .93; Complexity of Representations, .78; and Accuracy of Character 
Ascriptions, .76.
The intercorrelations of the six PA derived measures are presented in Table 2. 
Correlations were significant for Integration of Episodes and Accuracy of Causal 
Attribution, Complexity of Representations and Affect-Tone of Relationship, Accuracy 
of Character Ascriptions and Affect-Tone, and Accuracy of Character Ascription and 
Complexity of Representations. Internal consistency was evaluated for the six scales. The 
standardized inter-item alphas were as follows: Integration of Episodes, .81; Accuracy of 
Causal Attribution, .63; Affect-Tone of Relationship, .48; Capacity for Emotional 
Investment, .94; Complexity of Representations, .57; and Accuracy of Character 
Ascription, .43. Findings were similar to those reported by Segal et al. (1993) with the 
exception of Complexity of Representations being substantially lower (Segal et al. 
reported .73) and Accuracy of Character Ascription moderately lower (Segal et al. 
reported .58).
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Syndromal Dimensions Results
Standard multiple regressions were run on scores of each of the six PA derived 
measures, the mean of the PA derived measures and the standard PA scale score with 
scores on the three syndromal dimensions and premorbid adjustment ratings entered as 
predictors. The disorganized syndrome dimension was a significant predictor of 
performance for Integration of Episodes, t = -1.95,/? < .05, partial r = -.29, Affect-Tone 
of Relationship, t = -2.39, p  < .05, partial r = -.35, Accuracy of Character Ascriptions, t = 
-236, p  < .05, partial r = -.35, and mean PA derived measures, t — -2.04,p  < .05, partial r 
= -.30. Premorbid adjustment rating was a significant predictor of performance for PA 
scale scores, t = 2.01 ,P <  .05. partial r = .30. Neither the psychotic nor the negative 
syndrome dimensions were predictive of performance on the PA derived measures, the 
mean score of the PA derived measures, or the PA scale score.
Axis I  Diagnosis Results
Multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was used to test for differences 
between Axis I diagnosis groups and the PA derived social cognition measures, average 
social cognition score, and Wechsler IQ test PA sub-test scale score. Significant 
differences were found among the Axis I diagnosis groups on Integration of Episodes, 
F(2,44) = 3.85,/? < .05, Accuracy of Causal Attribution, F{2,44) = 4.10,/? < .05, mean 
score of the PA derived measures, F(2,44) = 3.96, p  < .05, and the PA scale score,
F(2,43) = 4.42,/? < .05. Post hoc analyses were done using Tukey’s HSD procedure to 
identify specific group differences (see Table 3). Results indicated that individuals 
diagnosed with bipolar disorder differed significantly from individuals with
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schizophrenia and schizoaffective disorder, with bipolars consistently outperforming 
schizophrenics and schizoaffectives.
Interactions between Symptoms, Diagnosis, and Overall Cognitive Ability
Correlations between the syndromal dimensions and the WRAT 3 and the WAIS- 
R PA scaled score were computed. The correlation was significant for disorganized 
symptoms and the PA scale score, r = -30, p  < .05, and approached significance for the 
WRAT 3, r = -.25, p  < .10. A significant difference was also observed between 
diagnostic groups and performance on the PA scale score, F(2,43) = 4.42, p  < .05, and 
the difference approached significance for the WRAT 3, F{2,44) = 2.10,/? = .13.
Standard multiple regressions were run on scores of the six PA derived measures 
and the mean of the PA derived measures with the WAIS-R PA scale scores and the 
disorganized syndromal dimension as predictors. The regression equations indicated that 
PA scale scores were the strongest predictors of performance on three of the PA derived 
measures (i.e., Integration of Episodes, Accuracy of Causal Attributions, and Accuracy of 
Character Ascriptions) and the mean of the PA derived measures. Disorganized symptom 
ratings remained the strongest predictor for Affect-Tone of Relationships and were 
moderately predictive of Accuracy of Character Ascriptions (see Table 4).
A MANCOVA was performed to assess the effect the Picture Arrangement test 
estimate of cognitive functioning had on the significant differences observed for several 
PA measures and Axis I diagnosis. Axis I and gender were entered as the between- 
subjects factors and PA scaled scores were entered as a covariate. After the general 
cognitive scores were covaried there was no longer any significant difference among 
Axis I diagnosis on the PA subscales. A second MANCOVA was run with Axis I
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diagnosis and gender entered as between-subject factors and WRAT scores entered as a 
covariate. When differences on WRAT scores were controlled for there were no longer 
any differences between Axis I diagnosis and performance on the PA subscales.
30
DISCUSSION
The findings of this study support the hypothesis that disorganized symptoms are 
related to impaired performance on measures o f social cognition. The disorganized 
symptom dimension was a significant predictor of performance on several of the Picture 
Arrangement derived social cognition measures, specifically, Integration of Episodes, 
Affect-Tone of Relationships, Accuracy of Character Ascriptions, and the mean of the 
PA derived measures. This finding supports prior research (Rowe & Shean 1997; Shean 
et al. 2002) that symptoms of disorganization are related to greater cognitive impairment. 
Negative and psychotic syndrome dimensions were not predictive of performance on any 
of the PA social cognition measures.
Axis I diagnosis was also related to the social cognition measures, with 
individuals diagnosed with bipolar disorder outperforming individuals with schizophrenia 
and schizoaffective disorder. This finding supports clinical observations that people with 
bipolar, when not in an active manic state, demonstrate generally intact social abilities. 
Based on the behavior of bipolars, not acutely manic, it does not appear that their ToM 
has been permanently compromised, thus allowing them to understand their own and 
others’ mental states.
Although significant relationships between symptoms, diagnosis and social 
cognition measures were observed, there was also an association between symptoms, 
diagnosis and general cognitive functioning as measured by WAIS-R PA subtest scale 
scores. Symptoms of disorganization were correlated with both the PA scale scores, an
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estimate of current cognitive functioning, and the WRAT 3, an estimate of premorbid 
cognitive functioning. When the PA scale score estimate of cognitive functioning was 
entered as an independent variable it became the sole predictor of social cognition scores 
on all of the PA derived measures, except for the Affect-Tone of Relationships and the 
Accuracy of Character Ascriptions subscales. Disorganized symptoms remained the most 
significant predictor of performance for these subscales. When general cognitive 
measures were evaluated as covariates there was no longer a significant difference among 
Axis I diagnosis for social cognition measures.
Segal and Westen et al. (1992; 1993) did not correlate their PA derived measures 
with general cognition tests so it is impossible to determine if the same interaction of 
general and social cognition was present in their samples of people with borderline 
personality disorder, depression, and normal controls. It may be that the social cognition 
measures are so heavily influenced by the general PA task that poor performance on the 
general task of arranging the cards will result in low social cognition scores just by virtue 
of the interaction between the two. Part of the reason for having the participants “tell the 
story” was to allow the researcher to take into account appropriate stories despite 
incorrect picture arrangement. In practice, however, it seemed that when the participant 
was not able to put the cards in a relatively correct arrangement they were also unable to 
tell a coherent story. The story was forced to follow the incorrect card arrangement 
sometimes leading to disjointed and strange stories.
The correct card arrangement seemed to affect scores on some scales more than 
others. This may explain why the Affect-Tone of Relationships and the Accuracy of 
Character Ascription scales were not predicted by the general cognition measure. These
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two scales do not rely as heavily on the arrangement of the cards. The Affect-Tone of 
Relationships scale is scored based on whether the participant ascribes malevolent or 
idiosyncratic negativity to characters in the pictures. Generally participants did not 
ascribe malevolence to the characters, but when they did it was often unrelated to the 
correctness of the card arrangement. Similarly, the Accuracy of Character Ascription 
scale measures the participants’ ability to attribute reasonable traits, thoughts, feelings, or 
intentions to the characters. This can be done with the cards in virtually any order. On the 
other hand, the Integration of Episodes scale measures that participants’ ability to tell a 
coherent story. A story would receive a low score on this scale if they told the story card 
by card and a high score if they formed an integrated plot. The ability to do this clearly 
relies heavily on a reasonable arrangement of the cards. The Accuracy of Causal 
Attributions is also greatly influenced by card arrangement as it measures how the 
participant explains the causal links between actions in the cards. If the cards are not in 
the correct order it becomes difficult to make reasonable causal explanations. In these 
cases participants often left out explanations or created peculiar explanations to 
compensate, both of which resulted in a lowered score. Based on this evidence the scales 
that rely heavily on correct card sequence are going to be highly related to general 
cognitive abilities as measured by PA scale scores, whereas those scales that are 
relatively independent of card arrangement may be less influenced by general cognitive 
performance.
Additionally, it is important to consider the role attention may play in the mutual 
impairment of general and social cognition. As reported previously Walker and Harvey 
(1986) and Comblatt et al. (1985) found that symptoms of disorganization were
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positively related to distraction. The findings of this study may be the result of impaired 
attention negatively affecting performance on both general and social cognition tasks. An 
individual with a predominance of disorganized symptoms may be unable to focus his or 
her attention on the task resulting in lower test scores.
The effects of medications must always be considered when evaluating a 
psychiatric population. Often participants’ antipsychotic medications are translated into 
Thorazine equivalents so that they can be controlled for in statistical analyses. This study 
did not lend itself to such measures, as many of the participants were prescribed 
medications other than antipsychotics. Mood stabilizers were predominant either alone or 
in combination with antipsychotics for many of the participants in this sample. When 
medication effects cannot be controlled for there remains a possibility that the results 
may have been influenced by the therapeutic and side effects of the medication. 
Medications are more often prescribed in relation to symptoms present than diagnosis. 
Perhaps individuals with a predominance of disorganized symptoms are more likely to be 
prescribed medications that interfere with their ability to perform well on general and 
social cognition tasks. For all of these reasons it is unclear what aspects of the symptoms 
of disorganization are most responsible for impaired cognitive functioning, both general 
and social.
Participants in this study were inpatients in a state psychiatric hospital who were 
invited to voluntarily participate. The sample is inherently biased because of this self­
selection process. Individuals who agreed to participate and were able to complete the 
testing may not be representative of the general inpatient psychiatric population. For 
example, individuals who were paranoid were often unwilling to be interviewed; those
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with severe negative symptoms could not motivate themselves enough to participate; and 
people with severe symptoms of disorganization were unable to focus their attention long 
enough on a task to complete even small portions of the testing session. Evidence of this 
sampling bias may be demonstrated by the unusually high WRAT 3 scores for the 
participants tested with 70% of participants scoring in the high school or above range and 
21% scoring in the post high school range. Utilizing a larger sample size in future 
research will not eliminate this bias, but it will reduce its effects and create a more 
representative sample.
The primary goal of this study was to determine if the PA derived measures, 
previously found to be predictive of social cognition in people with borderline personality 
disorder, could be utilized with a different psychiatric population know to have 
impairments in ToM and social cognition. Based on the results of this study several 
limitations of the PA measures when applied to this severe psychiatric population can be 
addressed. First, one of the derived measures did not perform in the same manner for 
these two populations, i.e. borderlines and schizophrenics. Westen and Segal et al. (1993) 
reported the most consistent support for the validity of three of the scales, Integration of 
Episodes, Accuracy of Causal Attributions, and Capacity for Emotional Investment. In 
this study the Capacity for Emotional Investment scale provided minimal information, as 
there was little variability of scores. This scale is designed to measure the participant’s 
capacity to invest emotionally in people, relationships, morals, and ideals. The majority 
of participants’ stories did not indicate a deficiency in this capacity. This may suggest 
that the Emotional Investment scale is not a relevant measure for individuals with 
psychotic disorders.
35
Second, the Accuracy of Character Ascriptions scale, as scored according to the 
manual, did not seem to accurately portray performance. The Accuracy of Character 
Ascriptions scale measures the participant’s description of the characters. It relies heavily 
on the scoring of the previous scale, the Complexity of Representations. For the 
Complexity of Representations scale participants are given a point for every emotion, 
intention, thought, and trait that is ascribed to the character. This complexity is then 
evaluated for accuracy in the following scale, i.e. the Accuracy of Character Ascriptions. 
The problem with this is that while participants who give detailed descriptions of the 
characters receive high Complexity scores they often receive lower Character Ascription 
scores because their descriptions are idiosyncratic. Conversely, participants who provide 
no description of the characters receive low Complexity scores, but high Character 
Ascription scores, by default, because they did not attribute to the characters any 
idiosyncratic traits. Therefore, participants who are just concretely describing what they 
physically see in the cards will receive high Character Ascription scores even though they 
have not ascribed any traits to the characters. This could possibly be resolved by adding 
another scoring level reflecting that the participant did not provide any character 
ascriptions.
Third, by having participants “tell the story” they used in arranging the cards a 
projective component is added to the PA test. While a projective test is highly applicable 
to evaluating individuals with personality disorders, it may not be as informative for 
those with a psychotic disorder. During testing it was rare that a participant added much 
more then was actually present in the cards. This may require a level of abstraction that 
many individuals with psychotic disorders lack. When additional information was
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provided it was usually to try to compensate for incorrect card sequencing. On rare 
occasions a participants’ delusion was projected onto the story. Differences in scores on 
the PA derived measures seemed to result mostly from incorrect card arrangement and 
therefore an incoherent story, not fully explaining the causal links between events in the 
cards, and difficulty in moving beyond the concrete description of the pictures on the 
cards.
In order to evaluate the usefulness of the PA derived measures of social cognition 
for a psychotic population further research is warranted. As mentioned previously a 
larger sample would need to be assessed in order to improve the representativeness of the 
sample. In addition, the relationship between performance on general cognition tasks and 
social cognition tasks needs to be considered further. It may also be that measuring social 
cognition via picture cards requires too much abstraction for many individuals with 
schizophrenia disorders and investigating another method of measurement could be 
fruitful. Valuable information could be gathered from a study that assessed symptom 
dimensions, several measures of general cognition, the PA subscale and its derived 
measures, as well as a more real-life social cognition task. Others have utilized role-play 
tests with a simulated social encounter to assess social skill level (Mueser, Bellack, 
Morrison, & Wixted, 1990). Videotaped encounters similar to those presented in the PA 
cards may provide a more ecologically valid assessment of social cognition. Results from 
a more comprehensive study, such as the one discussed here, could lead to more 
conclusive evidence regarding schizophrenia, its symptoms, and their effects on social 
cognition.
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TABLE 1
DEMOGRAPHIC AND CLINICAL INFORMATION FOR ALL PARTICIPANTS
All Particip. Schizophrenia Schizoaffective Bipolar
N 47 13 16 18
Gender
Male 21 5 7 9
Female 26 8 9 9
Age (M±SD) 38.80 ±9.92 37.46 ± 10.41 37.75 ± 10.72 40.82 ± 8.99
Previous
Admissions 
(.M±SD) 
Premorbid
3.72 ±3.76 3.69 ±4.27 3.50 ± 2.76 3.94 ±4.32
Adjustment
(M±SD)
2.51 ±1.78 2.23 ±1.69 1.81 ± 1.60 3.33 ±1.75
MMSE (M±SD) 26.80 ± 3.54 26.04 ±3.67 25.83 ±4.04 28.54 ±2.13
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TABLE 2
INTERCORRELATIONS OF THE SIX DERIVED PA MEASURES
Episode
Integ.
Causal
Attrib.
Affect-
Tone
Emotion
Invest.
Complex, 
of Rep.
Character
Ascrip.
Episode
Integration - .75** .19 .21 .17 .21
Causal
Attributions .18 .24 .23 .22
Affect-Tone 
of Relation. .07 _ .54**
Emotional
Investment .07 .05
Complexity 
of Rep. -.63**
Character
Ascriptions -
* * p <  .01
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TABLE 3
POST HOC COMPARISONS FOR AXIS I DIAGNOSIS AND PA SCORES
Schizophrenia Schizoaffective
Mean
Difference
Sig. Mean
Difference
Sig.
Bipolar Integration of 
Episodes
,39 .03* .27 .14
Accuracy of 
Causal 
Attributions
.38 .03* .29 .09
Mean PA 
Derived 
Measures Score
.16 .04* .13 .07
PA Scaled 
Score
1.81 .17 2.77 .02*
* p  < .05
40
TABLE 4
PREDICTION OF SOCIAL COGNITION FROM SYNDROMAL DIMENSIONS AND
GENERAL COGNITIVE ABILITIES
Significant
Predictor
t P Partial r
Integration of 
Episodes
PA Scale 
Score
5.13 .00 .62
Accuracy of Causal 
Attributions
PA Scale 
Score
3.45 .00 .47
Affect-Tone
Capacity for 
Emotional Investment
Complexity of 
Representations
Disorganized
Syndrome
None
None
-2.22 .03 -.32
Accuracy of Character 
Ascriptions
PA Scale 
Score
2.01 .05 .30
Disorganized
Syndrome
-1.70 .10 -.25
Mean PA Derived 
Measures Score
PA Scale 
Score
4.70 .00 .59
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